Blue Line Collision

[Busjack]

Hmm... so if the brakes are cut out the train can't be tripped.

It probably can trip the power.

But it gets down to your point that how did they get out of the yard if they were supposed to be sitting in the yard with the brakes on, at least on cars 3 and 4.

[Amtrak41]

Insulated wheels can also make a train invisible to the signal system, which can be used on MoW equipment, but that's not the case here.

Back here on NYCT, former BMT/IND (and PATH) have triphammers and tripcocks on the opposite side of the tracks than on the ex-IRT. When #7 Line (not physically connected to the rest of the IRT) equipment moves to Coney Island Yard for heavy maintenance on the BMT (daily at around 8pm), an old R33S Redbird single unit (similar to the R28's at IRM) must be the driving motor leading and MU'd with R62A's as they have tripcocks on both sides.

[sw4400]

Here's a little info from the preliminary accident report:

• The two "Out Of Service" cars were attached to two "Horse" cars that were to pull them to Skokie Shops for repairs. Somehow the "Out Of Service" cars managed to engage and move forward even though the "Horse" cars were attempting to stop them but were overpowered.
• Investigators believe that the fail-safe systems the CTA did have in place, including the two switches the railcars rolled over, did attempt to stop the train to no avail. The "Horse" cars were trying to brake and stop, but were driven forward by the "Out Of Service" cars. But without those "Horse" cars, the "Out Of Service" railcars would've traveled at a much higher rate of speed than 20 mph at the In-Service train stopped at Harlem, turning an accident with 33 injuries(and the "usual" multiple lawsuits that follow from those just looking for $$) to an accident with a lot more injuries plus possible fatalities .

Full story here

This report is preliminary, but unless you have inside sources at the CTA or NTSB, this is probably all you'll hear about the final report after all the facts are gone over and all railcars involved have been gone over with a fine tooth comb and toothbrush. Anything more will be tight-lipped I'm sure.

[Amtrak41]

Did tripcocks engage on the horse cars ?

There is something to be said for air brakes. If the tripcocks engaged anywhere in the consist, the whole train would have "dumped", but that concept does not exist on CTA.

Evidently, none or insufficient hand brakes were set, just like Le Megantic, Quebec.

[Busjack]

Here's a little info from the preliminary accident report:

• The two "Out Of Service" cars were attached to two "Horse" cars that were to pull them to Skokie Shops for repairs. Somehow the "Out Of Service" cars managed to engage and move forward even though the "Horse" cars were attempting to stop them but were overpowered.
• Investigators believe that the fail-safe systems the CTA did have in place, including the two switches the railcars rolled over, did attempt to stop the train to no avail. The "Horse" cars were trying to brake and stop, but were driven forward by the "Out Of Service" cars. But without those "Horse" cars, the "Out Of Service" railcars would've traveled at a much higher rate of speed than 20 mph at the In-Service train stopped at Harlem, turning an accident with 33 injuries(and the "usual" multiple lawsuits that follow from those just looking for $$) to an accident with a lot more injuries plus possible fatalities .

Full story here

This report is preliminary, but unless you have inside sources at the CTA or NTSB, this is probably all you'll hear about the final report after all the facts are gone over and all railcars involved have been gone over with a fine tooth comb and toothbrush. Anything more will be tight-lipped I'm sure.

After reading the report, it concedes there isn't enough information there to determine if the NTSB determined anything.

The "one pair overcame the other pair" seems to support what BusHunter said that there were reports that it left smoking, if the brakes on #3 and #4 were overcome.

However, I don't get the part about idling, as electric motors are either on or off, and somehow got engaged despite the dead man. Also, disconnecting the coupler pins would prevent "communications" through the train wires between car #2 and #3, but with all the talk about needing jumpers to transmit the 600 v current between car #2 and #3, and each car having contact with the third rail, I don't see where that recommendation is going, either.

[artthouwill]

My youtube video has the cbs coverage of them lifting the car up with cables, it's trucks just hanging underneath the train. I'm assuming that's why they had the chainsaw out there. They wouldn't want a serrated edge cutting on the cables.

I guess for the last car lift onto a flatbed, we would have to go back to 1984, when 6647-48 was crushed on the kennedy/montrose incident. (Pictures on ebay) I know the addison 1976 incident did. The 6000 involved had the worst damage I've ever seen.

Actually I'm kind of surprised 3177 had so much damage with only a 20mph impact. The train accident looked faster than that. Maybe the ntsb when they make out the final report will say how fast it was going. With the addison 1976 accident two to three times as bad that collision had to be 40mph or greater. Obviously the follower then was doing skip stop service. If you can imagine that speed going through addison blue line.

If the 1976 incident you are referring to is the same one I'm thinking of, it was a 6000 series train that was on the incline south of Addison before it descends into the subway. That operator left the cab, but I guess didn't set the brakes properly, and his train rolled back into a standing B train at the Addison station. Both trains were headed SB. I don't think that the 6000 series A train got up to 40, and that incline isn't as steep as the one from Forest Pk to Harlem. However, once at the bottom of the incline approaching Circle Ave I suppose a free wheeling train could lose some speed, sort of like taking your foot off the accelerator or a free rolling car (in neutral) after it hits a straightway coming from an incline. Once the "runaway" train got to the bottom of the hill, the train could only slow down approaching Harlem. Had the WB track been clear, perhaps the train comes to a complete stop around Oak Park Ave .

[twyztdmynd]

I only caught part of Jay Levine's rant at 6pm but the cause is partly due to water leaking into the cab.... entering a wire junction box.

http://chicago.cbslocal.com/2013/10/04/ntsb-water-damage-power-left-on-factors-in-runaway-blue-line-train-collision/

[Busjack]

I only caught part of Jay Levine's rant at 6pm but the cause is partly due to water leaking into the cab.... entering a wire junction box and shorting the braking system.

http://chicago.cbslocal.com/2013/10/04/ntsb-water-damage-power-left-on-factors-in-runaway-blue-line-train-collision/

The web site and embedded video don't say anything about brake failure causing the incident, only that chocks should be put under the wheels in case of brake failure (which would seem to be a simple precaution).

I suppose that the water could have shorted something, but it would need to have shorted something in a way that didn't affect propulsion, but did affect the 4 or 5 "fail safe" safety measures. They didn't say anything about the controller key or dead man, but maybe it will come down to that they were shorted out.

Certainly a "freak" accident.

[trainman8119]

If the 1976 incident you are referring to is the same one I'm thinking of, it was a 6000 series train that was on the incline south of Addison before it descends into the subway. That operator left the cab, but I guess didn't set the brakes properly, and his train rolled back into a standing B train at the Addison station. Both trains were headed SB. I don't think that the 6000 series A train got up to 40, and that incline isn't as steep as the one from Forest Pk to Harlem. However, once at the bottom of the incline approaching Circle Ave I suppose a free wheeling train could lose some speed, sort of like taking your foot off the accelerator or a free rolling car (in neutral) after it hits a straightway coming from an incline. Once the "runaway" train got to the bottom of the hill, the train could only slow down approaching Harlem. Had the WB track been clear, perhaps the train comes to a complete stop around Oak Park Ave .

Actually it was south of Montrose not Addison. The 6000 was on the incline to Irving Park and the second train was leaving the Montrose Station.

[trainman8119]

Here's a little info from the preliminary accident report:

• The two "Out Of Service" cars were attached to two "Horse" cars that were to pull them to Skokie Shops for repairs. Somehow the "Out Of Service" cars managed to engage and move forward even though the "Horse" cars were attempting to stop them but were overpowered.
• Investigators believe that the fail-safe systems the CTA did have in place, including the two switches the railcars rolled over, did attempt to stop the train to no avail. The "Horse" cars were trying to brake and stop, but were driven forward by the "Out Of Service" cars. But without those "Horse" cars, the "Out Of Service" railcars would've traveled at a much higher rate of speed than 20 mph at the In-Service train stopped at Harlem, turning an accident with 33 injuries(and the "usual" multiple lawsuits that follow from those just looking for $$) to an accident with a lot more injuries plus possible fatalities .

Full story here

This report is preliminary, but unless you have inside sources at the CTA or NTSB, this is probably all you'll hear about the final report after all the facts are gone over and all railcars involved have been gone over with a fine tooth comb and toothbrush. Anything more will be tight-lipped I'm sure.

The NTSB publishes their reports at NTSB.GOV website. You can read all about it when it is complete. Of course with the (http://ntsb.gov) federal shutdown, nobody will know anything. (When the site is back up running, for example, you can read up on the Blue Line subway fire from a couple of years ago or the collision near Cabrini Green.)

[Busjack]

The NTSB publishes their reports at NTSB.GOV website. You can read all about it when it is complete. Of course with the (http://ntsb.gov) federal shutdown, nobody will know anything. (When the site is back up running, for example, you can read up on the Blue Line subway fire from a couple of years ago or the collision near Cabrini Green.)

After the government gets rolling again, the indications are that it will still take about a year to get the official report.

[2200fan]

http://www.suntimes.com/news/metro/22966985-418/ntsb-blue-line-runaway-train-was-left-with-power-on.html

What "setting" is there that lets a train proceed after emergency stops?

[Busjack]

http://www.suntimes.com/news/metro/22966985-418/ntsb-blue-line-runaway-train-was-left-with-power-on.html

What "setting" is there that lets a train proceed after emergency stops?

That's even more mysterious. There is that the train can start again after being stopped by a red cab signal and beeping (which caused the 1977 Lake and Wabash crash), but there there was an operator. That article doesn't explain how the dead man was overcome.

And there was the prior stink about what happens (at say Granville) when a train tries to back over a switch. Apparently this one had no trouble going straight through, but backwards.

The only thing that makes sense to me in the article is that disconnecting the battery would disconnect the low voltage control circuits.

[trainman8119]

After the government gets rolling again, the indications are that it will still take about a year to get the official report.

Absolutely, but the fact remains that the info will be published (if you know where to look) and not

be hidden and forgotten about as was previously stated.

[2200fan]

I imagine some sort of bracket could be fabricated to hold the deadman in position, maybe for testing purposes? However, after an emergency stop, wouldn't the controller lever have to be released and operated again? Isn't this what happened in the 1977 loop crash?

[Busjack]

I imagine some sort of bracket could be fabricated to hold the deadman in position, maybe for testing purposes? However, after an emergency stop, wouldn't the controller lever have to be released and operated again? Isn't this what happened in the 1977 loop crash?

The report on the Loop crash (see chicago-l,org*) had that a named operator was not paying attention, and while the speed was under the cab signal limit, he not only hit the train in front of him, but continued to apply power, thus pushing his train off the tracks and structure. That page reflected a lot of theories about "what was he thinking," but clearly he was at the control.

The other thing that reviewing that seems to raise in this case is that even if there was a way to restart after the track trip, there should have been a red signal before it approached the train stopped in the Harlem station, and hence even if the red could have been overridden, the train should have been doing under 15 mph, not 20 as reported.

Again, I'm not the NTSB, but my guess from the latest news articles is that the short must have affected all the logic of the controls (dead man and cab signal). I don't think there was a reason to disable the dead man mechanically, and if it had been done, I'm sure that the newspapers would have mentioned it.

Update: The Tribune article had a little more explanation of "powered up," in the sense of the ability to leave the lights on, and while it mentioned the controller position, still didn't mention how it overcame the dead man.

Which reminds me of ....but I'm not saying.

___________

*If the link doesn't work, go to "Mishaps and Unusual Occurrences" at the bottom of the home page.

[BusHunter]

Going through some of pictures last night, I found a picture of #3177 that I took during the farewell #2200's trip August 8th, 2013. This was seven weeks before the blue line collision on Sept 30th, 2013 that destroyed the end of #3177. Although insignificant at the time, it may be one of the last pictures of the car in service. This was taken at Forest Pk BTW.

[trainman8119]

The report on the Loop crash (see chicago-l,org*) had that a named operator was not paying attention, and while the speed was under the cab signal limit, he not only hit the train in front of him, but continued to apply power, thus pushing his train off the tracks and structure. That page reflected a lot of theories about "what was he thinking," but clearly he was at the control.

The other thing that reviewing that seems to raise in this case is that even if there was a way to restart after the track trip, there should have been a red signal before it approached the train stopped in the Harlem station, and hence even if the red could have been overridden, the train should have been doing under 15 mph, not 20 as reported.

Again, I'm not the NTSB, but my guess from the latest news articles is that the short must have affected all the logic of the controls (dead man and cab signal). I don't think there was a reason to disable the dead man mechanically, and if it had been done, I'm sure that the newspapers would have mentioned it.

Update: The Tribune article had a little more explanation of "powered up," in the sense of the ability to leave the lights on, and while it mentioned the controller position, still didn't mention how it overcame the dead man.

Which reminds me of ....but I'm not saying.

___________

*If the link doesn't work, go to "Mishaps and Unusual Occurrences" at the bottom of the home page.

What has not been made clear about all of this is whether the train was "powered up" for lights etc, or if the train had the cab active and was powered up for movement. If the cab was not set up to operate (shall we say "keyed up" for lack of a better description), the deadman is not an issue as it would not be active. In other words, if the key was not in the ignition (so to speak) and the reverser was not set up to operate there would be no deadman and all of this talk about it is nonsense.

[Busjack]

What has not been made clear about all of this is whether the train was "powered up" for lights etc, or if the train had the cab active and was powered up for movement. If the cab was not set up to operate (shall we say "keyed up" for lack of a better description), the deadman is not an issue as it would not be active. In other words, if the key was not in the ignition (so to speak) and the reverser was not set up to operate there would be no deadman and all of this talk about it is nonsense.

I would think that whether the key was there would have been the first obvious thing to check and report on, before digging into whether there was water in an electrical box. Of course, one would have to make one's own inferences from the lack of mention of that in the press (other than Kelly saying that there had to be a key to move the train normally).

The press didn't really explain what "powered up" meant.

[pudgym29]

Going through some of pictures last night, I found a picture of #3177 that I took during the farewell #2200's trip August 8th, 2013. This was seven weeks before the blue line collision on Sept 30th, 2013 that destroyed the end of #3177. Although insignificant at the time, it may be one of the last pictures of the car in service. This was taken at Forest Pk BTW.

Oh wow. I went through my photographs of 8 August, and I have a picture of 3177 too.

I think Bushunter's image is a little clearer. I was toward the center of the Forest Park Station.

[twyztdmynd]

CTA blames Switchman ,

http://chicago.cbslocal.com/2013/10/31/cta-suspends-switchman-in-sept-30-blue-line-crash/

[Busjack]

CTA blames Switchman ,

http://chicago.cbslocal.com/2013/10/31/cta-suspends-switchman-in-sept-30-blue-line-crash/

It seems like CTA was acting hastily in disciplining an employee without disclosing what cased the collision, but Kelly is there complaining that the charges came too late.

Note that I said earlier that if there were a key in the controller, that should have been the first thing reported, but if "keyed up" means that, today is the first that it was mentioned (similar remark in the Sun-Times Ventra column).

As usual, there will be a grievance and arbitration.

[jajuan]

It also got a brief mention in passing in the Trib's Breaking News article about the rail operator union making the stink that CTA should put off full implementation of Ventra until the all the problems and glitches are fixed.

[Busjack]

Channel 7 story was just updated on the 5 p.m. news with a bit more detail, including two employees suspended and two electricians fired. As I predicted, they did mention that the union was going to "grieve" the switchman's 3 day suspension. The contention, as indicated on that report, was that Kelly says leaving trains powered up was standard practice, while CTA claims that the switchman didn't report for about 48 hours that the train was powered up.

[sw4400]

Saw this five days ago and just decided to put this up now.... does this mean John Q. Public has a set of keys and can take a "L" train for a joyride and possibly cause a catastrophic crash, or worse of two "L" trains??? Or are they merely saying if a set of keys was stolen???

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